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AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS AND ATTORNEY
LIABILITY: THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE
Lynn A. Baker*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Over the past several decades, attorneys involved in mass tort
settlements, especially those representing the plaintiffs, have faced an
increasing number of large-dollar liability claims centered on the
aggregate settlement rule; that is, the state equivalents to Rule 1.8(g) of
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules").
* Frederick M. Baron Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
LBaker@law.utexas.edu. This Article was prepared for the Hofstra Law Review conference on
"Lawyers as Targets: Suing, Prosecuting and Defending Lawyers," held at the Maurice A. Deane
School of Law at Hofstra University on April 1, 2015. I am grateful to Susan Fortney for inviting
me to participate in the conference and for her generous written comments on an early draft. I also
benefitted from the comments of, and discussions with, the conference participants. I am indebted to
Nancy Moore and, especially, Charlie Silver for valuable written comments on a previous draft and
for many stimulating and enjoyable conversations on these issues over the past seventeen years.
I serve as a consultant to law firms that handle group settlements, and was a consultant in
some of the cases referenced in this Article. I co-authored a pro bono Amicus Brief (1998 WL
35336105), Supplemental Amicus Brief (1999 WL 35047216), and Supplemental Letter Brief (1999
WL 35047216) in support of David Burrow (all with Charles Silver) in Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d
229 (Tex. 1999).
1. For the text of Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules, see infra note 7 and accompanying text.
The vast bulk of cases involving such liability claims, with opinions or orders available on Westlaw,
have arisen since 2004. See, e.g., Britton v. Girardi, 185 Cal. Rptr. 3d 509, 511, 513 (Ct. App. 2015)
(breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, filed by clients against their attorneys in connection with
alleged aggregate settlement "in excess of $100 million" of claims of ninety-three insureds against
State Farm Insurance Co. arising out of the 1994 Northride earthquake); Prakashpalan v. Engstom,
Lipscomb & Lack, 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 832, 841 (Ct. App. 2014) (same); Abbott v. Chesley, 413
S.W.3d 589, 596-97 (Ky. 2013) (breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by clients against their
attorneys in connection with alleged aggregate settlement of 431 Fen-Phen claims against American
Home Products for $200 million); Fleming v. Curry, 412 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App. 2013) (breach
of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by more than 600 former clients against attorneys in
connection with alleged aggregate settlement of Fen-Phen claims of "8,051 clients for an aggregate
amount of $339 million"); Waggoner v. Williamson, 8 So. 3d 147, 149-51 (Miss. 2009) (breach of
fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients against their attorney in connection with $73.5
million alleged aggregate settlement of forty-five clients' Fen-Phen claims against American Home
Products); Middleton v. Arledge, Nos. 3:06-cv-303, 3:07-cv-350, 2008 WL 906525, at *1.4 (S.D.
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During this period, courts have held that fee forfeiture, potentially
totaling millions of dollars, is an appropriate remedy for violations of the
aggregate settlement rule ("the Rule"), even in the absence of any
demonstrated economic harm to the client.2 At the same time, courts and
other authoritative bodies have expressed a variety of often conflicting
views regarding the obligations that the Rule imposes on attorneys and
Miss. Mar. 31, 2008) (motion seeking certification of a class of 6200 individuals who had settled
Fen-Phen claims against American Home Products as part of two alleged aggregate settlements
totaling $784 million, and who alleged their attorneys breached their fiduciary duties in connection
with the settlements); Authorlee v. Tuboscope Vetco Int'l, Inc., 274 S.W.3d Il l, 113, 116 (Tex.
App. 2008) (breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by former clients against a law firm
in connection with $45 million alleged aggregate settlement of approximately 179 individuals'
occupational exposure silicosis claims against AMF Tuboscope); Huber v. Taylor, 519 F. Supp. 2d
542 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (breach of fiduciary duty claims brought by clients against their attorneys in
connection with eleven alleged aggregate settlements with various asbestos defendants totaling
some $400 million), rev'd, 532 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008); Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 72, 82 (3d
Cir. 2006) (same); Jacobs v. Tapscott, No. 3:04-CV-1968-D, 2006 WL 2728827, at *1, *7 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 25, 2006) (breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients against attorney
in connection with alleged aggregate settlement of asbestos claims); Williamson v. Edmonds, 880
So. 2d 310, 314, 320 (Miss. 2004) (breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients
against their attorney in connection with $73.5 million alleged aggregate settlement of forty-five
clients' Fen-Phen claims against American Home Products); see also cases discussed infra, Part 11.
The pre-2004 cases include: Spera v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 25 S.W.3d 863,
866-67 (Tex. App. 2000) (breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients against law
firm in connection with $170 million alleged aggregate settlement of property damage claims of
more than 30,000 parties against two manufacturers of defective polybutylene pipes used in
plumbing systems); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232 (Tex. 1999) (breach of fiduciary duty
claims brought by former clients against five law firms in connection with $190 million alleged
aggregate settlement of wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits of some 126 plaintiffs in
connection with explosions at a Phillips 66 chemical plant in 1989); and Scrivner v. Hobson, 854
S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App. 1993) (breach of fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients
against attorney who represented them and 100 other families in connection with alleged aggregate
settlement of toxic waste claims against various corporations).
2. See, e.g., Hendry v. Pelland, 73 F.3d 397, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("[C]lients seeking
disgorgement of legal fees for a breach of their attorney's fiduciary duty of loyalty need only prove
that their attorney breached that duty, not that the breach injured them .... ); Silbiger v. Prudence
Bonds Corp., 180 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir. 1950) ("Certainly by the beginning of the Seventeenth
Century it had become a common-place that an attorney must not represent opposed interests; and
the usual consequence has been that he is debarred from receiving any fee from either, no matter
how successful his labors." (footnotes omitted)); Perl v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 345
N.W.2d 209, 213 (Minn. 1984) (holding that no causation or damage need be proved when seeking
fee forfeiture because "[tihe injury lies in the client's justifiable perception that he or she has or may
have received less than the honest advice and zealous performance to which a client is entitled");
Ulico Cas. Co. v. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, 843 N.Y.S.2d 749, 762 (Sup. Ct.
2007) (holding that fee "forfeiture will be ordered notwithstanding that 'the services were beneficial
to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity
by the agent' (citation omitted)); Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding
that "fee forfeiture exists in Texas in the context of the attorney-client relationship, and that all the
client need prove is a breach of fiduciary duty by the attorney"); Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207,
1213 (Wash. 1992) ("The general principle that a breach of ethical duties may result in denial or
disgorgement of fees is well recognized.").

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol44/iss2/7

2

Baker: Aggregate Settlements And Attorney Liability: The Evolving Landsc

AGGREGATE SETTLEMENTS AND A7TORNEYLIABILITY

2015]

293

when the Rule applies, resulting in much uncertainty and little guidance
for attorneys.'
This Article offers both positive and normative clarification. It
provides a thick description of the current interpretations of the
aggregate settlement rule in order to identify the specific areas of
authorities' disagreement. It goes on to offer a normative theory of the
Rule and its purpose, which could usefully mitigate the current
interpretive confusion regarding which settlements are "aggregate
settlements" and what client disclosures are mandated by the Rule.
Part II begins with a brief examination of the text of the Rule and
its literal requirements. Part III describes the current confusion about the
Rule among courts and lawyers by presenting a detailed case study of
the malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty lawsuits centered on the
Rule, which were filed in various state and federal courts against one
plaintiffs' attorney in connection with a $75 million mass tort settlement
in 2002, and many of which are still ongoing in 2016. Part IV builds on
the confusion portrayed in the case study by exploring three major
developments in the interpretation of the Rule on the core issues of what
an "aggregate settlement" is, and what client disclosures are mandated
by the Rule: (1) the 1997 decision of the Texas Court of Appeals in Arce
v. Burrow;' (2) the 2006 Formal Ethics Opinion 06-438 issued by the
ABA ("ABA Opinion");' and, (3) the 2010 publication by the American
Law Institute ("ALI") of Principles of the Law: Aggregate Litigation
("Principles").'Part V offers a normative theory of the Rule, with the
aim of clearing up much of the current confusion among courts, policymakers, and attorneys, and thereby also making more predictable the
professional liability to which the Rule increasingly gives rise.
II.

THE AGGREGATE SETTLEMENT RULE AND ITS REQUIREMENTS

The aggregate settlement rule is Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules,
and it states:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the
clients . . unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing
3. See, e.g., Authorlee, 274 S.W.3d at 120-21 (holding that the "trial court erred in
concluding that the settlements here were aggregate settlements"); id. at 129 (Keyes, J., dissenting)
("I cannot agree with the majority's factual conclusion that the agreed judgment is not an aggregate
settlement and that the individual plaintiffs' claims were not settled as part of an aggregate
settlement .... ); infra Parts 11-III.
4. 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App. 1997).
5. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006).
6.

See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION (AM. LAW INST. 2010).
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signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the
existence and nature of all the claims ... involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.7
Every state has adopted a version of the Rule, either as written or

with only minor alterations.' The ABA version of the Rule has been
essentially unchanged since its adoption as part of the Model Rules in

1983.9 Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules "carries forward Disciplinary
7.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013). The excerpt omits

those portions of the rule relevant to criminal cases, which are not the focus of this Article.
8. Every state has adopted Rule 1.8(g) of the Model Rules, the nearly identical Disciplinary
Rule ("DR") 5-106 of the Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility, or a similar rule. See Howard
M. Erichson, A Typology ofAggregate Settlements, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1769, 1781 (2005). A
few states have adopted Rule 1.8 with slight variations. Two states provide in the text of the Rule
that it does not apply in class actions. See LOUISIANA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (LA.
SUPREME COURT 2015) ("A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients ... unless each client gives
informed consent in a writing signed by the client, or a court approves a settlement in a certified
class action."); NORTH DAKOTA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (N.D. SUPREME COURT 2009)

("A lawyer who represents two or more clients, other than in class actions, shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients ... unless, after consultation,
including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement, each client consents."). Two states provide an
exception in the text of the Rule for court-approved settlements more generally. See NEW YORK
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N 2009) ("A lawyer who represents
two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or
against the clients, absent court approval, unless each client gives informed consent in a writing
signed by the client."); OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (OHIO SUPREME COURT 2007)

("A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate
settlement of the claims of or against the clients . . .unless the settlement or agreement is subject to
court approval or each client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client."). For a
useful discussion of state variations on Rule 1.8(g) involving court-approved settlements, see Nancy
J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintifs'Representation: Beyond the Aggregate Settlement

Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233, 3266-69 (2013).
In addition, several states omit the requirement in the ABA version of the Rule that each
client's consent be "in a writing signed by the client." See, e.g., MICHIGAN RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (MICH. SUPREME COURT 2015); PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 1.8(g) (PA. SUPREME COURT 2015); TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.08(f)
(STATE BAR OF TEX. 2014).

9. The only change to the text of Rule 1.8(g) since 1983 was the addition of the written
consent requirement as part of the broader 2002 amendments to the ethics rules, as proposed by the
ABA Ethics 2000 Commission. See STEPHEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS:

STATUTES AND STANDARDS 238 (2015). At the same time, the ABA added to Rule 1.8 a new
Comment [131, titled "Aggregate Settlements," which states, in relevant part:
Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks
of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is
one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of
the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects
each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of
settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal
case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides
that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of
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Rule (DR) 5-106 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
["Model Code"] 'almost verbatim.""' Thus, from the adoption of the
ABA Model Code in 19691 through the present, the Rule has existed in
essentially the same form.
In the plain language of its text, the Rule imposes two requirements
on attorneys representing multiple clients in connection with a proposed
aggregate settlement: (1) the attorney must provide each client covered
by the proposed settlement certain information regarding the terms of the
settlement, including the settlement offers to be made to each of the
covered clients; and, (2) the attorney must obtain the informed consent
of a covered client in order for that client's claims to be settled.
Over the past twenty years, much of the discussion and controversy
surrounding the Rule has been in the context of mass tort settlements.
Mass tort cases often involve personal injury claims and are only
infrequently brought as class actions.' 2 Rather, each claimant retains a
multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the
settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea
offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).
ABA CTR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY, ETHICS 2000 COMMIsSION REPORT ON THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 1.8 (2001), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional
responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2krulel8.html.
10. Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 734 (1997) (quoting 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM
HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT § 1.8:801, at 227 (2d ed. supp. 1997)). Rule 1.8(g) differs from DR 5-106 in that only the
latter includes "the total amount of the settlement" among the disclosures to be made by the lawyer
to her clients covered by the aggregate settlement. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESP. DR 5106 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1981), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N

&

2013). See also Silver & Baker, supra, at 734 n.4.
11. GILLERS ET AL., supra note 9, at 617-18 (discussing evolution of the ABA ethics rules
from 1908 through 1983); STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS 8-10 (10th ed. 2015) (same).
12. For a discussion of the difference between a mass action and a class action, see Silver
Baker, supra note 10, at 739-43. Professor John Coffee has observed:
At the beginning of [the 1980s], the mass tort class action was uniformly rejected
by appellate courts. By the end of the decade, it was at least provisionally embraced
by many.
Some of the reasons for the initial judicial skepticism of the mass tort class action
were obvious. First, the Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had suggested that a "'mass accident' . . .is ordinarily not appropriate
for a class action" because of the presence in such cases of significant issues (including
causation and possible defenses) that would impact upon the individual class members
differently. Individual issues and defenses, it was felt, would likely overwhelm the
common questions, and eventually disaggregation would become inevitable. Judicial
decisions following the 1966 revisions of Rule 23 were quick to take this hint to decline
class certification in mass tort cases.
Even when trial courts did certify a mass tort case, they were usually reversed.
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1343, 1356-57 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
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lawyer of her choosing, usually on a contingent fee basis, in order to
seek a recovery from the defendant(s). A law firm with experience in
mass tort litigation may end up representing hundreds or thousands of
individuals who claim they were injured by the same product" or in the
same event.1 4 Often, these individual cases will be consolidated for
discovery purposes under the jurisdiction of a single federal district court
pursuant to the Multi-District Litigation ("MDL") statute."
A handful of cases in a particular mass tort may go to trial, but the
overwhelming majority will ultimately be settled while the cases are
under the jurisdiction of the MDL court.' 6 In order to settle the hundreds
13. Common examples are asbestos and pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Madeksho v. Abraham,
Watkins, Nichols & Friend, 57 S.W.3d 448, 450-51 (Tex. App. 2001) (regarding a referral fee
dispute between plaintiffs' attorneys in connection with settlement involving "about two hundred
asbestos claimants"); Middleton v. Arledge, Nos. 3:06-cv-303, 3:07-cv-350, 2008 WL 906525, at
*1-4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2008) (motion seeking certification of a class of 6200 individuals who
had settled Fen-Phen claims against American Home Products as part of two alleged aggregate
settlements totaling $784 million, and who alleged their attorneys breached their fiduciary duties in
connection with the settlements); see also supra note 1.

14. Examples include plant explosions and toxic waste. See, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d
229, 232 (Tex. 1999) (lawsuit against five plaintiffs' attorneys who together represented 126
plaintiffs in wrongful death and personal injury lawsuits related to explosions at a Phillips 66
chemical plant in 1989); Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tex. App. 1993) (breach of
fiduciary duty claims, inter alia, brought by clients against an attorney who represented
approximately 100 families in connection with alleged improper aggregate settlement of toxic waste
claims against various corporations).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012) states:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that transfers for
such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and will
promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so transferred
shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings
to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated ....
For useful discussions of the MDL process, see generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging
Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015); Jaime Dodge, Facilitative Judging:
OrganizationalDesign in Mass-MultidistrictLitigation, 64 EMORY L.J. 329 (2014); Deborah R.
Hensler, The Role of Multi-Districtingin Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31

SETON HALL L. REV. 883 (2001); John G. Heybum II, A View from the Panel:Part of the Solution,
82 TUL. L. REV. 2225 (2008); Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn't Fit All:
MultidistrictLitigation, Due Process, and the Dangers of ProceduralCollectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV.

109 (2015); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation if a Class
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Quasi-ClassAction Method of ManagingMulti-DistrictLitigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63

VAND. L. REV. 107 (2010).
16. A well-known example is the Vioxx litigation that was largely resolved through a $4.85
billion nationwide settlement in 2009. Lynn A. Baker, Alienability ofMass Tort Claims, 63 DEPAUL
L. REV. 265, 272 n.17 (2014). As I have previously noted, "more than 47,000 claimants had filed
cases and were potentially eligible to participate in the settlement, but only 16 cases involving 17
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or thousands of claims against a defendant, its counsel may begin by
negotiating with those plaintiffs' lawyers whose firms each represent a
large number of claimants. Defense counsel will often seek to reach a
settlement with each such firm for its entire "inventory" of cases. In
negotiating such group settlements, defense counsel may seek to arrive
at a total dollar amount for which the plaintiffs' firm is willing to settle
all of its clients' claims. The allocation of the total settlement fund
among that firm's claimants is frequently left to the plaintiffs' counsel,
with defense counsel often explicitly declining to play any role in that
allocation process.
It is important to note that such a settlement agreement does not
itself settle any claimant's case. It is simply an agreement between the
plaintiffs' firm and the defendant for settlement offers to be made to the
firm's clients, which total no more than the specified dollar amount. The
settlement agreement will often contain a "walk-away" provision, under
which the defendant will have a unilateral option to terminate the
settlement agreement and to settle none of the claims covered by the
agreement unless a specified percentage of covered claimants accept
their settlement offers under the terms of the agreement.1 7
In the mass tort context, two core questions arise with regard to the
aggregate settlement rule: (1) When is a settlement an "aggregate
settlement" covered by the Rule, rather than simply a group settlement
(to which the Rule may not apply)? And, (2) what disclosures must be
made by the plaintiffs' attorney to the clients potentially eligible to
participate in the aggregate settlement?
The answers to both questions clearly matter to the plaintiffs'
lawyers undertaking such settlements if they are to handle them properly
under the Rule and avoid breach of fiduciary duty claims or disciplinary
sanctions or both." The answers also should matter to defense counsel,
however, insofar as a settlement that is determined to be improper under
claimants were tried." Id. at 272. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch has observed, "[w]hile multidistrict
litigation is ostensibly for pretrial purposes only . .. transferee judges have remanded a scant 2.9%
of cases to their original districts [for trial or other resolution]." Burch, supranote 15, at 73.
For discussions of the processes by which the MDL judge may select "bellwether" cases for
trial, see generally Loren H. Brown et al., Bellwether Trial Selection in Multi-DistrictLitigation:
EmpiricalEvidence in Favor of Random Selection, 47 AKRON L. REv. 663 (2014); Eldon E. Fallon
et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323 (2008); Alexandra D.
Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 576 (2008).
17. See, e.g., Settlement Agreement Between Merck & Co., Inc. and the Counsel
Listed on the Signature Pages Hereto, Dated as of November 9, 2007, at
41-43, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com/documents/Master/o20Settlement%20Agreement%
20-%20new.pdf (discussing conditions under which defendant Merck could exercise its "walkaway" rights).
18. See infra Parts III-IV.
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the Rule could result in a finding that defense counsel violated the
relevant state equivalent of Rule 8.4(a) of the Model Rules, which states:
"It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce
another to do so, or do so through the acts of another.""
Currently, however, there is much confusion among courts and
other authorities, and therefore, also among attorneys, regarding the
answers to these two questions.2 0 To illustrate both the nature of this
confusion and its significant implications for plaintiffs' attorneys, the
next Part discusses the lawsuits which were filed in various state and
federal courts against one plaintiffs' attorney in connection with a $75
million mass tort settlement in 2002, several of which are still ongoing
more than a decade later.
III.

A CASE STUDY

In 2002, Missouri plaintiffs' attorney Grant Davis negotiated a $75
million settlement agreement ("Settlement Agreement"), 2 1 which sought
to resolve the claims of approximately 240 cancer patients who he
represented against drug manufacturers Eli Lilly and Bristol-Meyers
Squibb. 2 2 The cancer patients sued the drug companies for negligence
involving pharmacist Robert Courtney's admitted dilution of
chemotherapy drugs, alleging that the drug companies had knowledge of
Courtney's dilution and had breached a duty to prevent it. 23
The Settlement Agreement that Davis negotiated with the drug
companies was seemingly crafted with care. The Missouri trial judge,
the Honorable Lee E. Wells, explained that "[a]fter the proposal of the
pharmaceutical companies was advanced, counsel for the parties sought
the Court's involvement in devising an appropriate methodology for the
settlement proposal."2 4 And, the Kansas Supreme Court described the
result of this collaboration as follows:
[A] settlement agreement was reached in which all plaintiffs who had
filed a lawsuit against the companies were eligible to "opt in." Under
the agreement, titled "Global Settlement," the defendants would
establish a settlement fund of not less than a specified amount and not

19.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(a) (Am. BAR ASS'N 2013).

20. There is also disagreement among various authorities regarding the answers to these two
questions, as discussed further below in Part IV.
21. Booth v. Davis, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1320 (D. Kan. 2014).
22. Id.; Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune & Jones LLC, 204 P.3d 617, 620 (Kan. 2009).
23. Booth, 57 F. Supp. 3d at 1320; Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 620.
24. Appellants' Brief on Unsealing the Record at 4, G.H. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 S.W.3d 326
(Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (No. WD75942).
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more than a specified amount, with the exact amount to be determined
through binding arbitration.
The Missouri trial judge, Judge Lee Wells, appointed two special
masters. One was a former circuit court judge and the other was a
former Missouri Court of Appeals judge. Judge Wells worked with the
special masters to develop a system for evaluating the individual
claims .. .. Essentially, the special masters would apply uniform
standards to each claimant who had opted in to the settlement and
would determine the amount of money each claimant would receive
from the settlement fund.25
Within a few months after the Settlement Agreement was executed,

all of the covered claimants had signed a Release and had agreed to
settle their claims under the terms of the Settlement Agreement.26
Throughout the settlement process, Judge Wells entered various orders
approving and implementing the settlement.27 On May 29, 2003, the
"[trial] court approved individual dollar allocations, ordering that the
awards entered on behalf and in [favor] of plaintiffs. . . are equitable
and appropriate, and those monies should be distributed accordingly." 28
Toward the end of 2003, one of the claimants who had voluntarily
opted into the settlement, the surviving family of deceased cancer patient
Rita Tilzer ("the Tilzers"), refused to go forward with the settlement.2 9
The defendant pharmaceutical companies filed a motion with the
Missouri trial court to enforce the Settlement Agreement against the
Tilzers.30 Two days later, Davis filed a motion to enforce an attorney's
lien in the case."1
The Tilzers argued, in opposition to the motion to enforce the
Settlement Agreement, that it was "illegal and unethical on its face" and
that it violated the Missouri aggregate settlement rule. 32 Shortly
thereafter, the Tilzers filed a counterclaim against Davis's motion to
enforce an attorney's lien, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, professional
negligence, and breach of contract in connection with the Settlement
Agreement.33 The core of the Tilzers' claim, as in their opposition to the
25. Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 620.
26. Appellants' Brief on Unsealing the Record, supra note 24, at 4.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id.
29. As reported by the Kansas Supreme Court: "[The] Tilzers opted in to the settlement
agreement and completed the applicable claim form.. .. The special masters established the dollar
amount to be awarded to [the] Tilzers, and Judge Wells [of the Missouri trial court] approved that
award, despite [the] Tilzers' objection." Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 620.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 620, 627-28.
33. Id. at 620. The Tilzers also asserted the same claims in a separate action filed in the U.S.
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motion to enforce the settlement, was that the Settlement Agreement that
Davis negotiated, and which Judge Wells had helped craft and had
approved, violated the Missouri aggregate settlement rule.3 4
In its order of January 14, 2004, the Missouri trial court (Judge
Wells) granted Davis's motion on the attorney's lien and
memorialized its order granting enforcement of the settlement
agreement. Judge Wells specifically found that the Global Settlement
was not an aggregate settlement within the meaning of [Missouri's
aggregate settlement rule], because of the methodology developed by
the court and special masters.35
In his order, Judge Wells specifically held:
The law firms did not settle the plaintiffs' claims on an aggregate basis
or otherwise. Rather, the law firms negotiated a proposed settlement in
which plaintiffs could either elect to participate or else continue to
pursue their own lawsuit. Plaintiffs were under no obligation to choose
this settlement method to resolve their case. They could have
continued litigating their case and proceeded to trial, but they elected
not to do so. If plaintiffs had elected to continue litigating their case,
that decision would not have affected the other parties to the
settlement. Rule 4-1.8(g)[, Missouri's aggregate settlement rule,]
therefore does not apply. 36
Judge Wells also found "no credible evidence of any misconduct
by Davis."
The Tilzers did not appeal the Missouri trial court's rulings.
Instead, three weeks later, they filed a legal malpractice claim in a
Kansas court (the District Court of Johnson County), making essentially
the same claims against Davis and his firm that they had presented
unsuccessfully in the Missouri case." Notwithstanding the Missouri trial
court's finding that the settlement was not an "aggregate settlement," in
the Kansas case, the Tilzers "specifically alleged that the Missouri
settlement agreement was effectively an aggregate settlement and that
Davis had failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of

&

District Court for the District of Kansas prior to January 2, 2004, but that action was dismissed for
lack of complete diversity. Id. at 620-21.
34. Id. at 620, 625.
35. Id. at 621.
36. Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendants Grant L. Davis & Davis, Bethune
Jones, LLC for Summary Judgment at 13, Tilzer v. Davis, Bethune & Jones, LLC, No. 04 CV
03239, 2007 WL 6782308 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2007) (quoting the Jan. 14, 2004, order from the
Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri).
37. Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 621.
38. Id.
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[Missouri's aggregate settlement rule] ." Although the Johnson County
court held that the "Tilzers were collaterally estopped from relitigating
the aggregate settlement question,"4 o it nonetheless went on to note, in
denying the Tilzers' motion for partial summary judgment, that
because "the amount that each of [Davis's and his firm's] clients
would receive ... was not and could not have been known by the
lawyers prior to the announcement to all of the opted in
claimants[,] . . . this could not be an aggregate settlement contemplated
by the rules of professional conduct."4 1
The Tilzers appealed the summary judgment rulings to the Kansas
Supreme Court, which overturned the Kansas district court's holdings
on the aggregate settlement issues. The Kansas Supreme Court reasoned
as follows:
Under the ALI definition, the Global Settlement had both
characteristics of interdependency which define an aggregate
settlement. There was collective conditionality because the
pharmaceutical companies were granted the right to opt out of the
settlement if fewer than all of the covered plaintiffs accepted the
proposed settlement. Although Judge Wells attempted to circumvent
the conditional allocation characteristic by appointing special masters
to individually assess each claim, the Global Settlement contained a
maximum amount that the defendants would pay into the settlement
fund and provided for an across-the-board minimum payment to all
opt-in claimants. In other words, each claimant did not receive
individualized, fact-specific damages, but rather each claimant
received an individualized, fact-specific allocation of a proportion of
the capped settlement fund, subject to a minimum award for
every participant.
Likewise, the Global Settlement runs afoul of the ABA guidelines.
A particular amount of damages was not negotiated on behalf of each
individual plaintiff. Rather, a percentage of the total settlement fund
was established for each individual plaintiff. Thus, the amount
awarded to one plaintiff directly affected the amount of the other
plaintiffs' awards. More importantly, each plaintiff was not free to
accept or reject the special masters' proffered award, as poignantly
illustrated by Judge Wells' order forcing [the] Tilzers to accept their
calculated share of the pot.
Therefore, notwithstanding the concerted effort of Judge Wells and
the special masters to devise a mechanism to avoid labeling the Global
Settlement as an aggregate settlement, the defining characteristic of
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 621-22.
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interdependency remained intact. The terms of the Global Settlement
contained all of the important features of an aggregate settlement.
The Kansas district court was seduced by Judge Wells' opinion that
the Global Settlement could not be an aggregate settlement because the
information that Rule 4-1.8(g) required to be disclosed to obtain an
informed consent was not available to Davis. However, that dearth of
information was the direct result of the interdependent characteristics
of the Global Settlement, i.e., the information could not be ascertained
because the arrangement was an aggregate settlement. Rather than
establishing a non-aggregate settlement, the unavailability of the
information required to be disclosed by Rule 4-1.8(g) simply
corroborated that it was an aggregate settlement and rendered it
impossible for Davis to obtain an informed consent under the rule. The
district court's ruling to the contrary was erroneous. 42
The Kansas state court case was remanded for further proceedings, 43 and
a decision has not been rendered as of January 18, 2016.
Shortly after the Kansas Supreme Court handed down its 2009
decision, the same attorneys who sued Davis on behalf of the Tilzers in
the Missouri and Kansas state courts filed a similar, aggregatesettlement-based, legal malpractice suit against Grant Davis in federal
district court in Kansas on behalf of the surviving family of deceased
cancer patient Connie Booth.44 As of October 2014, six additional
former clients had joined the Booth family's federal court malpractice
lawsuit against Davis, in which the court stated: "It is agreed that the
state law of Missouri must be applied."4 5 A portion of that case was
ongoing as of January 18, 2016.46
In a final, related proceeding, twenty clients who settled their
claims against the defendant drug companies under the 2002 Settlement

42. Id. at 628-29.
43. Id. at 630.
44. Booth v. Davis, No. 1O-CV-4010, 2010 WL 4160116, at *1-3 (D. Kan. Aug. 31, 2010);
Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 619 (listing the attorneys for both sides).
45. Booth v. Davis, 57 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1320 (D. Kan. 2014). As noted in the case caption,
the six parties that joined the Booth family in their claims against Grant Davis are Kimberly Carrell,
Virgil Wille, Prudence Kirkegaard, the Boehmer family, the Waldon family, and the Schmitz
family. Id.; see also Wille v. Davis, No. 11-4121, 2015 WL 3822762, at * 1 (D. Kan. June 19,2015)
("Currently, there are six other cases assigned to this court with similar claims against defendant.").
46. Virgil Wille's case against Grant Davis was dismissed on summary judgment on June 19,
2015, as having been untimely filed. See Wille, 2015 WL 3822762, at *1, *7. An appeal to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was filed in that case on July 21, 2015. See id. On August 20,
2015, the waldon family's case was also dismissed on summary judgment as having been untimely
filed. See Waldon v. Davis, No. 11-4060, 2015 WL 5006151, *1 (D. Kan. Aug. 20, 2015) (noting
that the "court's reasoning follows and shall track the format and text of the Wille order in
substantial part"). An appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was filed in that case
on September 1, 2015. Id.
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Agreement filed with the Jackson County, Missouri court in 2012 a
"Motion to Reopen Case, Void the Settlement and Releases, and Vacate
Orders Affirming Awards of Special Master" ("Motion").4 7 En route to
affirming the lower court's decision to deny the Motion, the Missouri
Court of Appeals devoted substantial space to a critique of the Kansas
Supreme Court's ruling on the aggregate settlement issues:
Rule 4-1.8(g) states that "[a] lawyer who represents two or more
clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the
claims of or against the clients . . . unless each client gives informed
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall
include the existence and nature of all the claims . . . and of the
participation of each person in the settlement." We recognize that the
Kansas Supreme Court in a malpractice action against one of the
attorneys involved with the settlement in this case found that "the
unavailability of the information required to [be] disclosed by Rule 41.8(g) simply corroborated that [the settlement agreement in this case]
was an aggregate settlement and rendered it impossible for [the
attorney] to obtain [his client's] informed consent under [Rule 41.8(g)].". . . We question, however, how an attorney can violate Rule
4-1.8(g) when he or she discloses all aspects of the settlement that
were known at the time that the clients agreed to participate in the
settlement. Indeed, an attorney is obligated to "abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." . . . In
this case, the attorneys would have had to convey the settlement offer
to their clients but then basically would have had to tell their clients:
"Although you may be interested in taking advantage of the settlement
offer, you can't because I don't know the exact amount all my clients
may receive under the settlement agreement." If the client demanded
that the attorney accept the settlement agreement and the attorney
refused, then the attorney would violate Rule 4-1.2(a). Surely,
Rule 4-1.8(g) is meant to protect clients from situations when an
attorney, who represents two or more clients in an aggregate
settlement, fails to disclose information known to him or her about the
existence and nature of all the claims and of the participation of his
clients in the settlement. Moreover, aggregate settlements are
permitted under Missouri law. Indeed, even Rule 4-1.8(g) does not
prohibit aggregate settlements. Rule 4-1.8(g) merely is an ethical rule
prohibiting an attorney, who represents two or more clients, from
participating in the making of an aggregate settlement of the clients'
48
claims unless each client gives informed consent.

47. G.H. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 412 S.W.3d 326, 327 n.1, 328 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013).
48. Id at 329 n.4. (citations omitted) (quoting Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 629).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2015

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 7

304

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:291

Whatever one's view of the merits of the ongoing case(s) against
Grant Davis in connection with the 2002 group settlement he negotiated
with the defendant drug companies, it is clear that much confusion
surrounds the aggregate settlement rule. Despite seeking and obtaining
the assistance of the Missouri trial court in crafting and administering
the 2002 settlement, and despite the fact that the Missouri trial court in
2004 "found no credible evidence of any misconduct by Davis," 9
fourteen years later, Davis finds himself to still be a defendant in
multiple malpractice cases in federal and state court in Kansas. All of
these cases involve allegations that (1) the 2002 settlement was an
aggregate settlement, and (2) Davis did not properly comply with the
relevant disclosure requirements of Missouri Rule 4-1.8(g) governing
aggregate settlements.so As discussed above, there has been significant
disagreement on both of these issues among the four courts that have
thus far opined on the aggregate settlement rule and its requirements in
the various cases involving Davis's 2002 settlement: the Circuit Court of
Jackson County, Missouri (2004); the District Court of Johnson County,
Kansas (2007); the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District (2013);
and the Kansas Supreme Court (2009).
If courts cannot agree on when a settlement is an "aggregate
settlement" for purposes of the ethics rules, or what disclosures are
required to be made by an attorney who negotiates a group settlement
along the lines of the one Davis agreed to in 2002, we might reasonably
expect that attorneys, too, are uncertain and confused about these issues.
Unlike judges, however, the attorneys-especially those who represent
the claimants in such settlements-are targets for potentially financially
devastating civil suits alleging malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty.
The attractiveness of these lawyers as targets is enhanced by several
facts: that a lawsuit based on a violation of the aggregate settlement rule
can be brought as a breach of fiduciary duty claim;" that the plaintiff
need not show any economic loss from the attorney's breach in order to

49. Tilzer, 204 P.3d at 620-21.
50. See supra notes 21-47 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Tex. App. 1997) (holding, in a lawsuit
filed by former clients alleging, inter alia, that attorneys breached the aggregate settlement rule, that
"fee forfeiture exists in Texas in the context of the attorney-client relationship, and that all the client
need prove is a breach of fiduciary duty by the attorney"); Hole v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., No.
700000/98, 2007 N.Y. Slip. Op. 50647(U), 2007 WL 969426, at *3-4, *4 n.10 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 27,
2007) (noting that "[n]o penalty is specified for a violation" of the New York aggregate settlement
rule, but citing Arce for proposition that "the remedy for violating the fiduciary duty to multiple
clients might be as severe as complete fee forfeiture if the attorneys committed the breach
intentionally, willfully, recklessly, maliciously, or with gross negligence"); see also supra note 2.
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prevail; 52 that full or partial forfeiture of the fees that the attorney
received from the former client is the remedy;" and, that many mass tort
settlements in which the aggregate settlement rule potentially applies are
for tens and hundreds of millions of dollars 4 and involve contractual
contingent attorneys' fees of one-third or more.
Given all this, it should not be surprising that numerous plaintiffs'
attorneys besides Grant Davis have been sued by their former clients for
alleged violations of the aggregate settlement rule in multi-million dollar
group settlements.56 It should be equally unsurprising that the two
attorneys who filed the first aggregate-settlement-related malpractice
and breach of fiduciary duty claims against Grant Davis have filed
similar lawsuits against various other plaintiffs' attorneys in connection
with other multi-million dollar settlements.
In the next Part, I explore an additional potential source of
confusion for both attorneys and courts engaged with the Rule, which
was not noted to date by any of the courts involved in the lawsuits
against Grant Davis: the evolution over the past two decades of the
liability landscape surrounding the Rule. In particular, I discuss different
authorities' approaches to two core issues: what is an "aggregate
settlement;" and what client disclosures are mandated by the Rule when
an aggregate settlement is involved?
52.

See supra note 2.

53. See, e.g., Eriks v. Denver, 824 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Wash. 1992) ("The general principle that
a breach of ethical duties may result in denial or disgorgement of fees is well recognized."); see also
supra note 51.

54. See supra note 1; see also supra note 16 (discussing $4.85 billion nationwide settlement
of Vioxx litigation).
55. See, e.g., Schmitz v. Davis, No. 10-CV-4011, 2010 WL 3861843, at *2 (D. Kan. Sept. 23,
2010) (noting that a mass tort claimant family agreed to pay their chosen law firm a contingent fee
of forty percent); Huber v. Taylor, No. 002-304, 2010 WL 358522, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 25, 2010)
(same); Abbott v. Chesley, 413 S.W.3d 589, 596 (Ky. 2013) (noting that the 431 Fen-Phen
claimants had each signed a contingent fee contract for between thirty percent and thirty-three and
one-third percent, depending on the particular law firm); Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 232
(Tex. 1999) (noting that the mass tort cases at issue settled for a total of "close to $190 million, out
of which the attorneys received a contingent fee of more than $60 million").
56. See cases cited supra note 1. In addition to these "published" cases, there are, of course,
other cases not readily found through a Westlaw search in which plaintiffs' attorneys were sued by
their former clients for an alleged violation of the aggregate settlement rule, but which were
resolved via confidential settlement.
57. In addition to the various lawsuits filed against Grant Davis discussed in this Part above,
attorneys William Skepnek of Kansas and Steven M. Smoot of Texas were counsel for the former
clients who sued the plaintiffs' attorneys in connection with the $190 million alleged aggregate
settlement in Arce v. Burrow, 958 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App. 1997), which was affirmed as modified
and remanded in Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999). They were also counsel for various
clients who sued the plaintiffs' attorneys in connection with a $45 million alleged aggregate
settlement of approximately 179 individuals' occupational exposure silicosis claims against AMF
Tuboscope in Authorlee v. Tuboscope Vetco International,Inc., 274 S.W.3d 111 (Tex. App. 2008).
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THE EVOLVING LIABILITY LANDSCAPE SURROUNDING THE RULE

A.

What Is an "AggregateSettlement"?

Although one might expect that an ethics rule explicitly concerned
with regulating aggregate settlements would define that critical term, the
text of Rule 1.8(g) has never included such a definition." Nor is such a
definition provided in the lone Comment to this subsection of Rule 1.8,
which is devoted to and titled, "Aggregate Settlements." 5 9
58. This is true of the version of the Rule adopted by the ABA, as well as the variants adopted
in every state. It should also be noted that the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission ("the Commission")
did not include among any of its proposed amendments to the Model Rules any definition of an
aggregate settlement. It did, however, amend the text of Rule 1.8(g) to specify that the client's
informed consent "be in a writing signed by the client" and added Comment [13]. See supra note 9
and accompanying text. The Commission's lack of interest in offering a definition of an "aggregate
settlement" is especially noteworthy since Professor Nancy Moore, who was appointed Chief
Reporter of the Commission, was independently interested in Rule 1.8(g) before the Commission
began its work. See generally Nancy J. Moore, The Case Against Changing the Aggregate
Settlement Rule in Mass Tort Lawsuits, 41 S. TEx. L. REv. 149 (1999); see also Charlotte
"Becky" Stretch, Overview of Commission and Report, ABA ETHICS 2000 COMMISSION,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/policy/ethics 2000_commission.ht
ml (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
59. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8 cmt. 13 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013). Comment [13]
goes no further by way of a definition than to reference "the risks of common representation of
multiple clients by a single lawyer." Id. (emphasis added). One state, Kentucky, has adopted a
variant of Comment [13] which seeks to provide lawyers both a definition and additional guidance:
Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the
risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7,
this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as
part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a)
protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an
offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a
criminal case. The Rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and
provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf
of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of
the settlement, as described herein.
A non-certified, non-class aggregate settlement is a settlement of the claims of two
or more individual claimants in which the resolution of the claims is interdependent. The
resolution of claims in a non-class aggregate settlement is interdependent if the
defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent upon the acceptance by a
specified number or percentage of the claimants or specified dollar amount of claims; or
the value of each claim is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts and
negotiations. In such situations potential conflicts of interest stemming from
interdependency exist, thus posing a risk of unfairness to individual claimants.
When the terms of an aggregate settlement do not determine individual amounts to
be distributed to each client, detailed disclosures are required. For example, if a lump
sum is offered in an aggregate settlement and the claimants' attorney is involved in
dividing the settlement sum, that attorney must disclose to each client the number of his
or her clients participating, specifics of each client's claim relevant to the settlement, and
the method of dividing the lump sum. In addition, the attorney must disclose the total
attomey fees and costs to be paid, payments to be made other than to clients, to their
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Until the 1997 decision of the Texas Court of Appeals in Arce v.
Burrow, no state or federal court had offered a definition of "aggregate
settlement". under Rule 1.8.6o In Arce, the Texas court stated: "An
aggregate settlement occurs when an attorney, who represents two or
more clients, settles the entire case on behalf of those clients without
individual negotiations on behalf of any one client." 6
Although the notion of "the entire case" being settled seems
misplaced here since group settlements involve the settlement of
multiple, individual cases, this first attempt at a definition arguably
offered attorneys (at least in Texas) a modicum of negative guidance. In
particular, this lone sentence could be read to suggest that an "aggregate
settlement" for purposes of Rule 1.8(g) would not exist if either the
settlement did not resolve all of the covered claims or the settlement
agreement specified the dollar amount of the individual settlement offer
for each of the covered claims. Thus, after Arce, there seemed to be
some difference between a group settlement and an aggregate settlement
for purposes of Rule 1.8(g).

attorneys and for costs, the method by which the costs are to be apportioned among the
clients and ultimately the amount each client receives.
By contrast, if the terms of the aggregate settlement establish the method of
calculating and distributing payments to each claimant, based upon the individual claim
for liability and/or damages, the disclosures to each client represented by the same
attorney do not need to be as detailed. In that instance, each client should be generally
informed of the terms of the aggregate settlement offer, how such terms apply
specifically to such client, the fact that the attorney represents multiple clients in the
settlement and, if applicable, any contingency in the settlement requiring a percentage of
claimants to accept the settlement. The claimants' attorney must also disclose fees and
costs to each client (including how costs are apportioned among the joint clients) but
attorney fees may be stated as a percentage of the total recovery as opposed to a specific
dollar amount.
RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY SCR 3.130 cmt. 13 (KY. BAR Ass'N 2015).
60. See Arce, 958 S.W.2d at 245. In Arce, the court's one-sentence definition of an "aggregate
settlement" was immediately followed by a citation to Scrivner v. Hobson, 854 S.W.2d 148 (Tex.
App. 1993). Arce, 958 S.W.2d at 245. The relevant sentence in Scrivner states implicitly that an
aggregate settlement is one in which an attorney who represents multiple clients obtains a
"settlement for which no individual negotiations on behalf of any one client were undertaken by the
attorney." 854 S.W.2d at 152. The Arce court continued as follows: "The attorney owes a duty of
loyalty and good faith to each client, and it is the ethical responsibility of an attorney representing
multiple clients to obtain individual settlements, unless those clients are informed and consent. See
Judwin Properties v. Griggs & Harrison, 911 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, no writ)." 958 S.W.2d at 245 (footnote omitted). It is not clear why the Arce court cited the
Judwin Properties case here, since neither the page cited nor any other page of the decision seems
to state anything along the lines of the proposition for which Judwin Properties is being cited. See
911 S.W.2d 498, 506 (Tex. App. 1995).
61. Arce, 958 S.W.2d at 245.
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In 2006, the ABA issued Formal Ethics Opinion 06-438, which
acknowledged that the term "aggregate settlement" is not defined in the
Model Rules and explicitly undertook to explain that term: 62
An aggregate settlement or aggregated agreement occurs when two or
more clients who are represented by the same lawyer together resolve
their claims . . . . It is not necessary that all of the lawyer's
clients . . . having claims against the same parties . .. participate in the

matter's resolution for it to be an aggregate settlement or aggregated
agreement. The rule applies when any two or more clients consent to
have their matters resolved together.
The claims . . . to be settled in an aggregate settlement or
aggregated agreement may arise in the common representation of
multiple parties in the same matter ... .They may also arise in
separate cases....
Aggregate settlements or aggregated agreements not only arise in a
variety of situations, but they also may take a variety of forms. For
example, a settlement offer may consist of a sum of money offered to
or demanded by multiple clients with or without specifying the amount
to be paid to or by each client.63
To the extent that this definition would include all situations "when
any two or more clients consent to have their matters resolved together,"
it is broader than the definition offered by the Arce court. Indeed, the
definition set out in the ABA Opinion seems to eliminate the space left
after Arce between a group settlement and an aggregate settlement for
purposes of Rule 1.8(g); all "group" settlements are now arguably
"aggregate settlements" and must comply with the disclosure
requirements of Rule 1.8(g).
Then, in 2010, the ALI published the Principles,which include four
sub-sections devoted to "non-class aggregate settlements."' The ALI
Principles also undertook to explicitly define a non-class aggregate
settlement, and its definition clearly views aggregate settlements as a
subset of, rather than synonymous with, group settlements:
(a) A non-class aggregate settlement is a settlement of the claims of
two or more individual claimants in which the resolution of the
claims is interdependent.

62. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, supra note 5. The ABA Opinion was
titled, "Lawyer Proposing to Make or Accept an Aggregate Settlement or Aggregated Agreement."
The ABA Opinion also explicitly notes that "aggregated agreement" is not defined in Rule 1.8(g).
63. Id. (footnotes omitted).
64.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION

§§

3.15-.18, at 257-82 (Am. LAW

INST. 2010).
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(b) The resolution of claims in a non-class aggregate settlement is
interdependent if:
(1) the defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent
upon the acceptance by a number or specified percentage of
the claimants or specified dollar amount of claims; or
(2) the value of each claimant's claims is not based solely on
individual case-by-case facts and negotiations. 65
This definition, in contrast to that set forth in the ABA Opinion, seems
to provide some space for group settlements to exist that are not
aggregate settlements under Rule 1.8(g).
For example, consider a hypothetical settlement involving forty
claimants represented by the same law firm in which defense counsel
and claimants' counsel first review each individual claim and then agree
that the sole relevant fact for purposes of determining a settlement offer
value for each claim is the claimant's injury category. Thus, each
claimant with a Category 1 injury will be offered $X to settle her claims;
each claimant with a Category 2 injury will be offered $Y to settle her
claims; and so on, for each of the four injury categories. If we assume
further that the defendant is willing to settle the claims of as many or as
few of the forty claimants as are willing to accept their settlement
offer,66 then the only remaining question under the ALI Principles's
definition of an "aggregate settlement" is whether "the value of each
claimant's claims" is or is not "based solely on individual case-by-case
facts and negotiations."6" An entirely plausible case can be made that the
settlement offer values in this hypothetical were based solely on
individual case-by-case facts and negotiations, both of which ultimately
focused solely on each individual's injury category.

65. Id. § 3.16, at 258. Section 3.16(c) of the Principlesfurther states: "In determining whether
claims are interdependent, it is irrelevant whether the settlement proposal was originally made by
plaintiffs or defendants." Id. § 3.16(c), at 259.
66. In section 3.16(b)(1), the ALI Principles state that an aggregate settlement as denoted by
"interdependent" claims is present if "the defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent
upon the acceptance by a number or specified percentage of the claimants or specified dollar
amount of claims." Id § 3.16(b)(1), at 258. The hypothetical in the text has assumed that this type
of interdependence is not present.
In addition, the hypothetical in the text assumes that the defendant is not operating under an
explicit or implicit cap on the total damages, and would therefore not present the concerns raised by
the ALI Principles on this issue. Id. § 3.16 cmt. b, at 260 ("[A] defendant generally knows the
amount it is willing to pay to settle a group of claims, so the notion that the defendant will treat each
of the lawyer's multiple claimants as separate and unrelated does not represent the typical manner in
which such claims are negotiated. If a settlement is subject to implicit caps, matrices, or other
collective methods of allocation, then the settlements constitute an aggregate settlement.").
67. Id. § 3.16(b)(2), at 258.
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Viewed in this way, the hypothetical settlement is not an aggregate
settlement under the ALI Principles's definition." At the same time,
however, this hypothetical settlement arguably presents a situation in
which "two or more clients who are represented by the same lawyer
together resolve their claims," which makes it an aggregate settlement
under the ABA Opinion's definition. 69
B.

What Client DisclosuresAre Mandatedby the Rule?

Unlike the definition of "aggregate settlement" which is nowhere
to be found in the text of Rule 1.8(g) or the official Comments,
the disclosures required by the Rule in order for a client to give
valid consent to an aggregate settlement are set out in the text of the
Rule as follows:
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the
clients . . unless each client gives informed consent, in a writing
signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the
existence and nature of all the claims ...

participation of each person in the settlement. 70

involved and of the

Although the Rule's statement regarding the required disclosures
could be clearer,n the text of the Rule can reasonably be understood to
require that all claimants eligible to participate in the settlement must
68. The comments to section 3.16 give several examples of settlements that are considered to
involve the "interdependent" resolution of claims under section 3.16(b)(2). See id. § 3.16 cmts. a-d,
at 258-60. However, my hypothetical in the text is distinguishable. For example, although my
hypothetical settlement treats claimants in like injury categories alike, it does not "apportion[]
identical sums based on a few broad categories (e.g., property damage, personal injury)." Id. § 3.16
cmt. d, at 260. The categories in my hypothetical are significantly narrower than "property damage,
personal injury." Id.
69. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supranote 5.
70.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).

71. As Charles Silver and I have previously written,
[t]he rule's disclosure requirement is also unclear-perhaps even incoherent. How can a
lawyer tell any client about the "extent of the participation of each person in the
settlement" until every client decides whether or not to participate? Counsel can disclose
each person's proposed participation, but actual participation cannot be known until
each client's consent is obtained. If information about actual participation is required, the
rule creates a Catch 22: Client X cannot give informed consent until he knows whether
Client Y consented, and Client Y cannot give informed consent until she knows whether
Client X consented. This conundrum led one commentator to observe that "literal
compliance" with the rule "is onerous, if not impossible."
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver in Support of Petitioner
David Burrow at 17, Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999) (No. 98-0184), 1998 WL
35336105, at *17 (quoting Paul D. Rheingold, Ethical Constraints on Aggregated Settlements of
Mass-Tort Cases, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 395, 402 (1998)).
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receive certain information about the terms of the larger group
settlement, including: the number of claimants covered by the settlement
agreement; the aspects of their individual claims relevant to determining
their individual settlement offer values; each claimant's relevant claim
characteristics for purposes of determining her settlement offer value;
and, each individual's settlement offer value. 2 in many group
settlements, this information is readily provided in the form of a matrix
along these general lines73 :
Number
of

Individual Gross
Settlement Offer

Total Gross
Settlement Offers

Claimants

Amount

Injury Category 1
[defined]

100

$10,000

$1,000,000

Injury Category 2
[defined]

72

$25,000

$1,800,000

24

$120,000

$2,880,000

Injury Category 3
[defaed
y3
[defined]
TOTAL

I

[

196

$5,680,000

In addition, it is usually thought advisable for claimants' counsel to
disclose in broad terms whether any conditions exist on the
consummation of the larger settlement, such as when the settlement
agreement specifies that the defendant retains the option to terminate the
settlement if more than a certain number of covered claimants decline
their settlement offers.74
72. See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement Rule and Ideals of Client
Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 227, 229-30, 229 n.9 (1999) (discussing possibility of providing
disclosures required by the Rule while still affording clients anonymity); Moore, supra note 8, at
3260-61 (2013) (noting that "[c]ourts and commentators have disagreed whether the current rule
requires the disclosure of the names and other identifying information of each client participating in
the settlement" and concluding that since "the rule does not expressly require the disclosure of
identifying information such as client names .. . the better interpretation is that plaintiffs' attorneys
are not required to disclose such information unless it is necessary for the plaintiffs to evaluate the
fairness of the allocation process"); Moore, supra note 58, at 164 (contending that "it should be
sufficient for the lawyer to disclose whatever information is needed to understand why some
individuals are receiving a different amount from other individuals," for example when "different
disease categories or degrees of injury may account for the discrepancy"); Silver & Baker, supra
note 10, at 756-60 (discussing ambiguities in the Rule's disclosure requirements).
73. The column in the matrix titled "Total Gross Settlement Offers" is not required by the text
of the Rule, but that information can be readily calculated by the claimants in any event, from the
information provided in the other three columns.
74. On its face, the Rule does not require the disclosure of this information regarding the
defendant's "walk-away" option, except insofar as the existence of that option indicates that the
settlement offers are merely "tentative" offers being made pursuant to a "potential" settlement
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Until 2006, there was no extended discussion of these
disclosure requirements in any ABA or state bar ethics opinions or
in the opinions of any court." In February 2006, however,
agreement. That information arguably is part of the information regarding "the participation of each
person in the settlement" which is obligated by the text of the Rule to be disclosed. See supra note 7
and accompanying text. It should be noted, however, that the Rule does not require that the precise
details of the defendant's walk-away right be provided to the claimants, for example, that "ninetyfive percent of eligible clients must accept their settlement offer or the Defendant has the option to
terminate the settlement." And there are many good reasons to provide the claimants information on
this issue only in broad terms rather than in precise detail. See Silver & Baker, supra note 10, at
767-68 (discussing opportunities for clients to engage in strategic behavior in connection with group
settlements that require unanimous consent of all eligible claimants). For a discussion of the
normative theory underlying a requirement that information about the defendant's "walk-away"
option be disclosed to clients, see infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
75. As noted in the ABA Opinion, see supra note 5, a handful of cases that mentioned the
aggregate settlement rule had been decided by the courts prior to 2006, but only a few of those cases
discussed the Rule's disclosure requirements, and none did so in any significant depth. See Hayes v.
Eagle-Picher Indust., Inc., 513 F.2d 892, 894 (10th Cir. 1975) (stating that "it would seem that
plaintiffs would have the right to agree or refuse to agree once the terms of the settlement were
made known to them"); In re Mal de Mer Fisheries, Inc., 884 F. Supp. 635, 640 (D. Mass. 1995)
(holding that "even if there were an actual misrepresentation [by the plaintiffs' attorney] as to the
[aggregate] nature of the settlement, that is not material because [the client] knew how much both
the other widow and she were getting"); In re Hoffman, 883 So. 2d 425, 433 (La. 2004) ("[D]uring
the negotiation of the aggregate settlement, the lawyer must confer with all of his clients and fully
disclose all details of the proposed settlement, including information about each client's claim and
share of the proposed settlement .. .. The requirement of informed consent cannot be avoided by
obtaining client consent in advance to a future decision by the attomey or by a majority of the
clients about the merits of an aggregate settlement."); Tax Auth., Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898
A.2d 512, 522 (N.J. 2006) ("[Rule] 1.8(g) imposes two requirements on lawyers representing
multiple clients. The first is that the terms of the settlement must be disclosed to each client. The
second is that after the terms of the settlement are known, each client must agree to the
settlement."); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Watson, 897 P.2d 246, 253 (Okla. 1994) (holding that
plaintiffs' counsel violated the Rule because he "made an aggregate settlement without obtaining
each client's consent or advising each client as to the proposed settlement and distribution.
[Plaintiffs' counsel] did not consult with all of his clients before accepting the
defendant's . . . settlement offer. . .. [One client]

was unaware of the final total award, its

distribution, and the participation of each client in the settlement . . . ."); Arce v. Burrow, 958
S.W.2d 239, 245 & n.4 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that "when an attorney enters into an aggregate
settlement without the consent of his or her clients, the attorney breaches the fiduciary duty owed to
those clients" and it is a violation of the aggregate settlement rule for "an attorney who represents
two or more clients to make an aggregate settlement without the clients' consent"), modified, 997
S.W.2d 229 (Tex. 1999); Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Tex. App.
1985) (holding that plaintiffs' counsel violated the Rule because plaintiffs "were not informed of the
nature and settlement amounts of all the claims involved in the aggregate settlement, nor were they
given a list showing the names and amounts to be received by the other settling plaintiffs"); see also
Scamardella v. Illiano, 727 A.2d 421, 426-28 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999). The Scamardella court
observed that "[flew cases have addressed directly the scope of disclosure required by Rule 1.8(g)."
Id. at 427. The court noted that "in this case the deficiency of disclosure did not result from a
withholding of information but rather from a failure to formulate in advance the apportionment
itself.. . . On the other hand, the very failure to formulate an apportionment preserved the
representation from the major conflict of interest that occurs in aggregate settlement cases." Id.
Ultimately, the court concluded that the disclosure was adequate to protect the rights of the clients
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the ABA issued Formal Ethics Opinion 06-438. The ABA Opinion
interpreted Rule 1.8(g) to
require[] a lawyer to disclose at a minimum, the following information
to the clients for whom or to whom the settlement or agreement
proposal is made:
* The total amount of the aggregate settlement ....
* The existence and nature of all of the claims . . involved in
the aggregate settlement ....
* The details of every other client's participation in the
aggregate settlement . . whether it be their . . settlement
receipts . . . or any other . .. receipt of something of value as a

*

*

result of the aggregate resolution....
The total fees and costs to be paid to the lawyer as a result of
the aggregate settlement, if the lawyer's fees and/or costs will
be paid, in whole or in part, from the proceeds of the
settlement or by an opposing party or parties.
The method by which costs (including costs already paid by
the lawyer as well as costs to be paid out of the settlement
proceeds) are to be apportioned among them. 76

Of the five mandated disclosures set out above, the second and third
are fully consistent with the text of the Rule. Although the first
disclosure is not required by the current text of the Rule, the information
involved is usually readily available to clients through the second and
third disclosures, and this disclosure had been explicitly required by the
text of the Rule's predecessor, DR 5-106.77 The fourth and fifth
disclosures, in contrast, have no basis in the text of the Rule and did not
exist prior to the ABA Opinion." And, the authors of the ABA Opinion
do not explain why they believed that Rule 1.8(g) requires these

because "the parties agreed that the settlement amount represented the maximum potential recovery
and, thus, was in the best interest of everyone." Id. at 428.
76. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, supra note 5 (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
77. See supra notes 10 & 73 and accompanying text. In most settlements, the clients will be
easily able to calculate the total value of the settlement from the information they are provided
regarding the number and settlement offer values of the claims included in the settlement.
It is not clear why this requirement was dropped from the Rule in the 1983 transition from DR
5-106 to Rule 1.8(g). As Charles Silver and I have previously noted, however, "[wie doubt that the
difference matters much in practice, as the total size of the settlement is frequently disclosed."
Silver & Baker, supra note 10, at 734 n.4.
78. Although the Rule itself covers settlements involving multiple defendants, as well as
multiple plaintiffs, disclosure number four is aimed solely at plaintiffs' attorneys who, unlike
defense counsel, will typically have contingent fee agreements with their clients under which "the
lawyer's fees and/or costs will be paid, in whole or in part, from the proceeds of the settlement."
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, supranote 5.
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additional disclosures." Their addition is especially puzzling in light of
the fact that each individual plaintiffs contingent fee contract will
necessarily specify the attorney's fees to be paid, as well as the handling
of litigation-related expenses, consistent with the relevant state's
equivalent of Rule 1.5(c) of the Model Rules."o
The adoption of the ALI Principles in 2009 provided yet another
view of the disclosures required under Rule 1.8. Section 3.17(a) of the
ALI Principles states:
[Informed consent to an aggregate settlement] requires that each
claimant be able to review the settlements of all other persons subject
to the aggregate settlement or the formula by which the settlement will
be divided among all claimants. Further, informed consent requires
that the total financial interest of claimants' counsel be disclosed to
each claimant. 81

The first requirement, that each claimant be provided information
about how the total settlement will be divided among all of the claimants
included in the settlement, is fully consistent with the text of the Rule.
The second requirement, however, that "the total financial interest of
claimants' counsel be disclosed to each claimant," does not appear
anywhere in the Rule. And the comments to section 3.17(a) never
mention this additional requirement; nor, therefore, do they offer any
insight into the reason for its addition.82
C. Implications
As the discussion in this Part makes clear, both the definition of an
''aggregate settlement" and the disclosures to clients required to be made
pursuant to the Rule have been subject to a variety of interpretations by
79. The ABA Opinion does include a footnote at the end of each of disclosures four and five.
But the sole authority cited is in support of disclosure four, and does not explain the addition of
even disclosure four: "See, e.g., In re Hoffinan, 883 So. 2d at 433 ('[D]uring the negotiation of the
aggregate settlement, the lawyer must confer with all of his clients and fully disclose all details of
the proposed settlement . . . .')." ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, supra note 5.
80. Rule 1.5(c) states, in relevant part:
A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client and shall state the
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage or percentages
that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal; litigation and
other expenses to be deducted from the recovery; and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. The agreement must clearly
notify the client of any expenses for which the client will be liable whether or not the
client is the prevailing party.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.5(c) (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
81. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(a), at 262 (AM. LAW INST.

2010).
82.

Id. § 3.17 cmt. a, at 264.
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various authoritative bodies since the adoption of the ABA's
Model Code in 1969. This presents at least two issues for attorneys
seeking to comply with the Rule, as well as for courts (and state bar
disciplinary committees) adjudicating claims that an attorney did not
comply with the Rule.
First, in any matter involving allegations that an attorney violated a
particular state's aggregate settlement rule, a reviewing court should pay
careful attention to how the applicable authorities interpreted the Rule
and its disclosure obligations at the time that the lawyer undertook the
settlement.84 That is, a 2002 settlement should be considered solely from
the perspective of the applicable authorities regarding the Rule available
to an attorney at that time, even if a court is reviewing the matter many
years later when additional, more recent authorities are available.
Second, as detailed above in this Part, the views of the various
authorities that have opined since 1997 on the definition of an
"aggregate settlement" and on the client disclosures that are mandated
by Rule 1.8(g) are not easily reconciled." Thus, at present, there is no
obvious consensus on either issue, which exacerbates the difficulties of
attorneys currently seeking to comply with the Rule. This lack of
consensus, I believe, is largely the result of various decision-makers
failing to focus on, and think clearly about, the purpose that the
aggregate settlement rule is intended-and arguably needed-to serve.
V.

TOWARD A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE AGGREGATE
SETTLEMENT RULE

In this Part, I undertake to situate the Rule in the larger context of
the ethics rules and offer a tentative normative theory for the function
that the Rule can uniquely serve. Such a normative theory can provide
guidance to courts and state bar committees seeking to apply the Rule in
particular cases." In addition, such a theory can provide lawyers greater

83. See supra Part IV.A-B.
84. Beyond the temporal issues, it is important to note that the mere existence of an
"authority" interpreting a particular variant of the aggregate settlement rule does not mean that the
authority's interpretation is applicable to, and therefore should be followed by, an attorney crafting
a particular settlement. An ABA Ethics Opinion, for example, is not binding on any state bar
disciplinary committee in general, or with regard to the "proper" interpretation of a state's own rules
of professional responsibility. Such an opinion is simply a statement of what a particular ABA
Committee believes in connection with the rule and/or topic addressed. A state bar committee, of
course, may choose to take guidance from such an opinion, but is not obligated to do so.
85.

See supra Part IV.A-B.

86.

Such a theory may also have benefits for policymaking groups such as the ABA and the

ALL.
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predictability regarding the likely application of the Rule, as well as
some first principles from which to reason about the Rule when
confronting a new situation.
A.

The Normative Theory

To begin, one should note that in addition to the aggregate
settlement rule, a plaintiffs' attorney contemplating a non-class group
settlement is bound by potentially relevant rules of professional
responsibility governing conflicts of interest, communications,
confidentiality, decisions to settle, and contingent fees. Thus, in order to
fully understand the normative underpinnings of the Rule, one must ask
what special problems are presented by certain types of group
settlements that are not resolved by those other rules such that an
additional aggregate settlement rule is required. That is, what does the
''aggregate settlement" rule add to the client protections and attorney
obligations afforded by those other rules?
I believe that the core normative function of the Rule is to ensure
the waivability of certain concurrent conflicts that might not otherwise
be waivable under Rule 1.7,87 thereby making ethically permissible
certain group settlements that might be prohibited in the absence of the
aggregate settlement rule.

87. Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules states:
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the
representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if:
(1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
(2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former
client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph
(a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other
proceeding before a tribunal; and
(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013).
In addition, Rule 1.8(b) of the Model Rules is arguably relevant in many aggregate settlement
situations. This rule provides: "A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a
client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted
or required by these Rules." Id. r. 1.8(b).
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In the absence of Rule 1.8(g), an attorney who represents multiple
clients against the same defendant and who receives an offer of a fixed
sum from the defendant to resolve all of their claims would potentially
have an irreconcilable client-client conflict. Every dollar of the lump
sum which the plaintiffs' attorney allocates to Client A is one less dollar
available to be allocated to any of the other clients. Under Rule 1.7(a),
the attorney's involvement in the settlement fund allocation is a
potentially prohibited concurrent conflict insofar as "there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client.""
The question under Rule 1.7(b) then becomes whether, notwithstanding
the conflict, "the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will
be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each
affected client" and "each affected client gives informed consent,
confirmed in writing.""
Many lawyers may "reasonably believe" that they cannot zealously
represent each of their multiple clients when allocating the limited
settlement funds among them and that the concurrent conflict is
therefore not one to which the affected clients can be asked to consent. 90
Thus, taken alone, Rule 1.7 arguably prohibits certain group settlements
and might indirectly make non-class multiple-client representations less
attractive to attorneys, notwithstanding the clear benefits to the plaintiffs
and also, potentially, the defendant(s). 9
The aggregate settlement rule, however, usefully supplements
Rule 1.7. Rule 1.8(g) makes clear that aggregate settlements are
ethically permissible and that the plaintiffs' attorney may ethically
participate in the "making" of such settlements, including allocating a
limited settlement fund. The Rule also provides some detail about the
content of the disclosures necessary in order for the attorney to obtain a

88. Id r. 1.7(a)(2).
89. Id. r. 1.7(b)(1), (4).
90. Nor could the attorney resolve the intra-client conflict by simply delegating the allocation
problem to a neutral third-party. The same conflict exists; it has simply been transferred to a
different person, who is the attorney's agent. Indeed, it merits note that Rule 1.8(g) is explicit that
the role of the attorney representing multiple clients in an aggregate settlement is to make certain
disclosures to the clients and obtain their consent; the rule does not state that the attorney should
hand off to a third-party the making of the settlement (along with any attendant allocation or other
conflicts). Id r. 1.8(g).
91. See, e.g., Baker & Silver, supra note 10, at 744-49 (discussing various important
advantages that plaintiffs can gain by litigating collectively); id at 760-63 (discussing benefits of
group settlements for both defendants and plaintiffs).
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client's informed consent to such a settlement.9 2 Put differently, Rule
1.8(g) provides a safe harbor for attorneys concerned that an aggregate
settlement creates a non-waivable conflict under Rule 1.7. It does not
impose any new requirements on an attorney beyond those imposed by
the other rules, but rather charts a path by which the plaintiffs' attorney
can provide clients the benefits of a non-class-action group settlement
without running afoul of Rule 1.7.
When Rule 1.8(g) is understood in this way, the disclosures it
requires the attorney to provide each affected client also take on broader
significance. Information about "the existence and nature of all of the
claims . .. involved and of the participation of each person in the
settlement"" is consistent with the attorney's obligations under Rule
1.4(b) to explain a settlement offer "to the extent reasonably necessary"
for the client to be able to make an informed decision about whether to
accept it. 94 At the same time, that information enables the client to
decide whether to consent to the concurrent conflict inherent in the
attorney's making of the aggregate settlement, consistent with
Rule 1.7(b)(4). 9 5 In sum, the disclosure and consent obligations under
Rule 1.8(g) seek to ensure that a client who is accepting her settlement
offer gives informed consent both to that offer and to representation
by the client's attorney who is laboring under a concurrent conflict
in the making of the settlement, including the allocation of the
settlement fund.96
If I am correct that the core normative function of the Rule is to
ensure the waivability of certain concurrent conflicts at the time of
settlement that might not otherwise be waivable under Rule 1.7, then
non-class-action group settlements can usefully be divided into two
categories: those settlements whose "making" presents a concurrent
conflict of interest for the plaintiffs' attorney, and those without any
such conflict. For the latter category of settlements, the absence of a
concurrent conflict limits the plaintiffs' attorney's disclosure obligations
to the communications required under Rule 1.4(b)." This means that the

92.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) ("The lawyer's

disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims . .. involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement."); supranote 7.
93.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g).

94. Id. r. 1.4(b).
95. Id. r. 1.7(b)(4).
96. See id. r. 1.8(g).
97. Id. r. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.").
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attorney should not be found ethically remiss or civilly liable if those
disclosures do not include "the existence and nature of all the claims"
involved in the group settlement and "the participation of each person in
the settlement" as required by Rule 1.8(g), unless disclosure of that
information is determined to be otherwise required under Rule 1.4(b)
and not prohibited by Rule 1.6(a).98 For the former category of group
settlements, the presence of a concurrent conflict means that the
attorney's disclosures should comply with Rule 1.8(g) in order for the
clients to be able to give informed consent to both their settlement offer
and their attorney's conflict of interest. Thus, the term "aggregate
settlement" in Rule 1.8(g) should be defined to include only settlements
that present a concurrent conflict of interest for the plaintiffs' attorney at
the time of their making.
B.

Applying the Normative Theory

The analysis above can now be used to evaluate, for example,
whether the definition of an "aggregate settlement" set out in the ALI
Principles is over-inclusive, under-inclusive, or just right in its scope.
Recall that the ALI Principlesdefines an aggregate settlement as one in
which "the resolution of the claims is interdependent," and further
defines the necessary claim interdependence as existing either when "the
defendant's acceptance of the settlement is contingent upon the
acceptance by a number or specified percentage of the claimants or
specified dollar amount of claims," or when "the value of each
claimant's claims is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts
and negotiations."9 9 Does each of these interdependences involve a
concurrent conflict of interest for the plaintiffs' attorney at the time of
the settlement?
Consider the ALI Principles's first definition of "interdependent
claims" for purposes of specifying an "aggregate settlement." Does a
settlement in which "the defendant's acceptance of the settlement is

98. Rule 1.6(a) states, in relevant part, that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
the representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent" or "the disclosure is
impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation." Id. r. 1.6(a). Thus, Rule 1.4(b) should
not be interpreted to require an attorney involved in a group settlement that does not pose any
conflict for the attorney to disclose information about other clients' settlement offers to any greater
extent than an attorney involved in an individual settlement would be obligated to share with that
client information about settlement offers obtained for other of the attorney's clients in the past.
99. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.16(b)(1)-(b)(2), at 258 (AM. LAW
INST. 2010) (emphasis added).
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contingent upon the acceptance by a number or specified percentage of
the claimants or specified dollar amount of claims"'o necessarily
involve a concurrent conflict? Yes. It presents an attorney-client
conflict.'o' When confronted with such a condition, as the ALI
Principles observes, "the [plaintiffs'] attorney has incentives to coerce
clients to agree to terms that may not be in the individual claimant's best
interests but that facilitate an aggregate settlement."' 02 The attorney's
incentives "to coerce clients" in this context derive from the fact
that the fee of the plaintiffs' attorney is typically contingent on
obtaining a recovery for the client, which in turn requires that the
settlement be consummated.
Now consider the ALI Principles's second definition of
"interdependent" claims. Does a settlement in which "the value of each
claimant's claims is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts
and negotiations"'o3 necessarily present "a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client ... or by a personal interest of
the lawyer"?'" I do not think so.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical situation in which counsel for
an asbestos defendant offers to enter into a settlement agreement with a
plaintiffs' law firm that currently represents 500 claimants. Under the
terms of the proposed settlement agreement, the defendant will offer the
following gross values to settle individual clients' claims against it,
assuming that a client can demonstrate the requisite exposure to the
defendant's asbestos-containing product:
* $100,000 for each claimant diagnosed with mesothelioma;
* $60,000 for each claimant diagnosed with lung cancer;
* $40,000 for each claimant diagnosed with cancers other than
lung cancer; and
* $15,000 for each claimant diagnosed with a non-malignant
asbestos-related disease (that is, asbestosis or pleural disease).
Assume further that under the proposed settlement agreement, the
defendant agrees to pay these specified values for as many or as few of
the law firm's clients-both its current clients and any future clients who
retain the law firm during the next five years-as are interested in
100. Id § 3.16 (b)(1), at 258 (emphasis added).
101. That is, it presents "a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by ... a personal interest of the lawyer." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
r. 1.7(a)(2).
102. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.16, cmt. b, at 261.
103. Id §3.16(b)(2), at 258.
104. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(2).
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settling their claims for that amount. Finally, assume that the law firm
believes that these are very good financial terms for claimants in each of
the four injury categories to resolve their asbestos-related claims against
this defendant.
This hypothetical settlement agreement does not involve a
concurrent conflict of interest for the plaintiffs' attorney. It does not
present any allocation conflicts among the attorney's 500 claimants.
There is not a pre-determined total dollar amount to be paid for the law
firm's 500 current clients, and indeed the total value of the settlement
has no specified limit and cannot be known until five years have passed.
The value of any individual claimant's settlement offer is unaffected by
the value of any other claimant's settlement offer, and each individual
claimant is free to accept or reject the settlement offer specified for her
injury category. Finally, the defendant's acceptance of the settlement is
not in any way contingent upon the number or dollar amount of claims
that are resolved under the agreement. Thus, this hypothetical settlement
would not constitute an "aggregate settlement" under the definition
derived from my normative analysis.
This settlement would seem to be an "aggregate settlement" under
the ALI Principles, however, because "the value of each claimant's
claims is not based solely on individual case-by-case facts
and negotiations."'o The plaintiffs' attorney would therefore be
obligated to make the disclosures required by Rule 1.8(g) under the
ALI Principles,but not under the definition of an "aggregate settlement"
derived from my normative analysis (unless disclosure of that
information is otherwise required under Rule 1.4(b) and not prohibited
by Rule 1.6(a)). 106
My normative theory and the hypothetical settlement agreement
discussed above suggest that the second prong of the ALI Principles's
definition of an "aggregate settlement" is over-inclusive. A settlement in
which "the value of each claimant's claims is not based solely on
individual case-by-case facts and negotiations"'0 does not necessarily

105.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw: AGGREGATE LITIGATION

§ 3.16(b)(2),

at 258 (emphasis added).

106. See supranote 98. Plaintiffs' counsel might well want to tell each claimant covered by the
settlement agreement that all claimants diagnosed with the same injury as the claimant are receiving
identical settlement offers from the defendant. But this would presumably be pursuant to an
obligation under Rule 1.4(b) of the Model Rules to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation," rather than
pursuant to any obligation under Rule 1.8(g). MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b). In
addition, claimant's counsel would need to ensure that such disclosures did not violate counsel's
confidentiality obligations under Rule 1.6(a). Id. r. 1.6(a). For discussion of confidentiality and
privacy issues raised by the aggregate settlement rule, see Silver & Baker, supranote 10, at 756-60.
107.

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW: AGGREGATE LITIGATION
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involve a concurrent conflict. The over-inclusiveness of the ALI
Principles'sdefinition could be eliminated, however, if this prong were
narrowed to include only settlements with a predetermined total dollar
value. A settlement that provides for a total predetermined sum to be
paid by the defendant to settle a specified number of claims, and which
leaves to the claimants' attorney the task of determining each claimant's
settlement offer amount from that sum, will present client-client
concurrent conflicts. Each dollar of the total settlement fund which the
claimants' attorney includes in one claimant's settlement offer is one
less dollar available for every other claimant's settlement offer.
My normative theory can also be used to evaluate whether the
additional disclosures required by the ALI Principles and the 2006 ABA
Opinion in their interpretations of Rule 1.8(g), as discussed above in Part
IV.B, should be required. If I am correct that the core normative function
of the aggregate settlement rule is to ensure the waivability of certain
concurrent conflicts at the time of settlement that might not otherwise be
waivable under Rule 1.7, then any required disclosures should focus on
those concurrent conflicts. Consider, for example, the requirement set
out in the text of Rule 1.8(g) that the "lawyer's disclosure shall include
the existence and nature of all the claims .

.

. involved and of the

participation of each person in the settlement." 1 8 Such a disclosure
enables a client to better evaluate the equity of her settlement offer than
would information solely about the amount and terms of the client's
individual settlement offer because it informs the client how the
plaintiffs' attorney has resolved the client-client conflicts inherent in the
settlement allocation. It enables the client to determine, for example,
whether, in that client's opinion, the plaintiffs' lawyer has unjustifiably
favored one client over another in establishing each client's individual
settlement offer amount.o' A client dissatisfied with her individual
settlement offer in light of this broader information about other clients'
claims and settlement offer values is free to decline to settle her claim
(and simultaneously to decline to consent to the attorney's conflict of
interest when making the settlement).Io
108.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g).

109. The key phrase here is "unjustifiably favored"-after all, any allocation of a settlement
fund will inevitably "favor" one client (or category of clients) over another in terms of giving them
different settlement offers. For a critical discussion of the Rule's ability to protect clients in a group
settlement from an "unfair" or "bad" allocation of the settlement fund, see Charles Silver & Lynn
Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs' Counsel in Allocating Settlement Proceeds, 84
VA. L. REV. 1465, 1515-39 (1998); see also Baker & Silver, supra note 72, at 240-45 (discussing
costs and benefits ofdamage averaging in group settlements).
110. Of course, the client's authority to accept or reject the settlement offer does not derive
from Rule 1.8(g), but rather from Rule 1.2(a), which states in relevant part: "A lawyer shall abide by
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In contrast to the disclosures required by the text of Rule 1.8(g),
there does not seem to be any conflict-based normative justification for
interpreting the aggregate settlement rule to require special, additional
disclosures regarding "the total fees and costs to be paid to the lawyer as
a result of the aggregate settlement""' or "the total financial interest of
claimants' counsel."'" Neither the ABA Opinion nor the ALI Principles
explain why they added these disclosure requirements, and it is not clear
what function they are intended to serve. As discussed above in Part
III.B, Rule 1.5(c) already requires that each individual claimant receive
clear and precise information regarding the contingent attorneys' fees to
be paid by that client, as well as the handling of that client's litigationrelated expenses. There is no reason to also provide clients the totals of
that information across the group of clients covered by the settlement
agreement. No client-client conflict or attorney-client conflict is
involved. The implication of these additional disclosure requirements in
both the ABA Opinion and the ALI Principlesseems to be that they will
better enable the clients to monitor an attorney-client conflict unique to
aggregate settlements. But, as discussed above, the only unique incentive
that an attorney has to coerce a client to agree to an aggregate settlement
derives from the presence of a walk-away provision in the settlement
agreement.' 13 The fact that an attorney will be receiving fees and a
reimbursement of litigation expenses from the clients included in an
aggregate settlement-just as an attorney does when representing a
single settling client--does not create any special incentives for the
attorney to put her own interests ahead of the best interests of her clients.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Over the past twenty years, non-class-action group settlements have
become increasingly common, especially for resolving mass torts, and a
wide range of policy makers and scholars have considered how the
potential conflicts can best be managed. Central to these discussions has
been the aggregate settlement rule, Rule 1. 8 (g) of the Model Rules and
the state equivalents. Courts, state bar associations, the ALI, and the
ABA have all offered thoughtful views on what an "aggregate
settlement" is and what client disclosures are mandated by the Rule. For
lawyers, however, these often conflicting opinions have provided
increased uncertainty rather than guidance.
a client's
111.
112.
113.

decision whether to settle a matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a).
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'1 Responsibility, supra note 5.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAw: AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17(a), at 262.
See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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In this Article, I have sought to offer both positive and normative
clarification. I have identified the specific areas of existing disagreement
among authorities and have charted a path forward by proposing a
tentative normative theory for the function that the aggregate settlement
rule can uniquely serve within the larger context of the ethics rules. I
hope that even those who do not embrace my theory will nonetheless
profit by being provoked to contemplate how best to resolve the current
interpretive confusion.
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